11.8.17

Anthony Signorelli: The Postcapitalist Manifesto

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A Unique Time in History
For the first time in 500 years, we could actually change the capitalist system. I mean replace it, not just revise it. I mean get rid of capitalism and create something new. And it is all happening because of the digital revolution. Virtually everyone on the cutting edge of social change has dreamt of this time. This is our moment to fix the systemic injustices, exploitations, violence, and hierarchy that plague society. Whether your focus is racial injustice, labor equity, sexual identity, poverty, climate change, feminism, sustainable land use, or indigenous culture, the dream has been to change the system. Well, “the system” is called capitalism, and we stand on the threshold of a dramatic, historic transformation. The driving force in this change is surprising. It is not socialism or communism. It is not religion and its moral concerns. It is not even our global political structures. Rather, this once-amillennium opportunity is being driven by capitalism itself and its relentless pursuit of digitalization. As I will show, that pursuit of digitalization will cause markets to malfunction, labor to become valueless, and investment to become meaningless. The logic of capitalism will stop working. This has never occurred before, and because of it, we have the opportunity to shape the future as no generation since the Renaissance.

But there is NO GUARANTEE!
Capitalism will be challenged as never before—that is for certain—and the new digital world will offer an alternative paradigm. Nonetheless, capitalism will fight back. It will wail and gnash its teeth; it will thrash its body against the emerging alternative. It will resist and attempt to impose its own alternative, which could be far worse than capitalism as we know it. Set aside a few minutes to read this manifesto. Take notes and write down your questions. See for yourself how this moment in history offers us the opportunity to shape a new world unlike anything that has come before. Our time is now.

The Opportunity No One Is Talking About
What I am about to share with you is something even society’s elites are beginning to understand, but dare not say. Here is the basic truth: Capitalism is driving digitalization, automation, and robotic production into the core of our society. It must do so because success in capitalism requires it. Everyone knows this will change everything, but the secret no one tells you is this: As a result of these changes, capitalism can no longer function. And if capitalism cannot function, it will be replaced. And if capitalism will be replaced, what will it be replaced with? You see, we are at a unique moment in history. The last big change in our economic system occurred about 500 years ago when feudalism—the system of lords, dukes, and kings—began to break down, and a new system known as capitalism began to take root. Since then, capitalism has become the dominant economic system in the world.
 Now we are on the brink of capitalism’s collapse, and it will be replaced as well.

Four Transformations: The Postcapitalist Opportunity
 As activists, environmentalists, and social theorists, all the problems we are concerned about— racism, sexism, homophobia, climate change, war, and so on—have the same root cause—the capitalist system. The collapse of the capitalist system will not just change our relationship to capitalist principles, it will actually replace these principles altogether. q Where capitalism is built on hierarchy, the postcapitalist world is built on egalitarian networks. q Where capitalism is built on violence and coercion, the postcapitalist world is built on voluntary participation. q Where capitalism is built on extraction, the postcapitalist world will be built on conversion. q Where capitalism is built on scarcity, the postcapitalist world is truly abundant because it provides infinite supply at no cost. These new principles—egalitarian networks, voluntary participation, conversion and virtual connections, and digital abundance—are the organizing principles for the new postcapitalist world. By replacing the old principles, these new ones provide the possibility of a completely new way of organizing society. And yet… It is entirely possible that we lose this opportunity. Capitalism will also be driven toward digital monopoly and the control of network platforms. It will be driven to maintain its global hegemony. It will attempt to sustain itself according to its own crumbling principles. Eventually, it won’t work; but eventually could be a long time. That is why I am publishing this manifesto now. This transition, which is both inevitable and undefined, provides us with the greatest opportunity in 500 years to shape a new economic system that addresses the problems, injustices, and unfairness of the old capitalist system. We have the opportunity to tear out the core principles underlying bigotry. We have a chance to change the ethic so that no one profits from environmental degradation or destruction. Indeed, we can define a new system that frees individuals from the shackles of job-defined offices and enables them to live to their highest and greatest potential. Yet, to take advantage of these opportunities, we need to see them clearly, understand them, and know where to take action and why it will work. This manifesto points the direction. You see, it will be up to us—the activists, environmentalists, and social theorists—to define what will replace capitalism. From foundational principles to specific policies and legal frameworks, everything is on the table. There is a competition brewing for the new dominant ideas—capitalism will certainly try to sustain itself—and a new set of ideas, generally known as postcapitalism, will arise to compete with capitalism. This is our opportunity to define those ideas, but this opportunity will only last for a while. The moment is upon us. In fact, it is already happening.

Where We Are Today
The Four Pillars of Capitalism Capitalism is based on the four principles of hierarchy, violent coercion, extraction, and scarcity, and it uses all of these principles to define social, political, and economic relationships. I call these four principles “pillars” because they are the foundation of a capitalist perspective. All of capitalism’s power and all of its problems derive from these four pillars.

Hierarchy
The first pillar is hierarchy. Capitalism requires a hierarchy so that power can flow through the system. Organizations are set up as a hierarchy of offices, with each office exercising power over a certain realm of activity, which often includes other offices beneath it. The office on top exercises power over the office on the bottom, and often the bottom office is an individual employee. All corporations are structured this way. All militaries are structured this way. All governments are structured this way. It doesn’t matter who the people are that fill those offices; it only matters that the office be competently filled by someone who is responsible for carrying out that office’s tasks. In this way, hierarchy has defined our economic relationships for centuries. But hierarchy goes much deeper, too. As a structural component of the capitalist society, it defines how the power flows, not just in business, but also in social and political relationships. In fact, it is so endemic to our culture that, in the mainstream, we tend to view hierarchical relationships as “normal,” and hierarchy becomes the basis of social power differentials in our society.

Violent Coercion
The second pillar is violent coercion. Capitalism is fundamentally coercive. It uses violence to coerce people into compliance, especially in the various forms of labor. Violence breaks strikes and peaceful protests; it drives conquest and the control of resources; it is the root of destruction in the natural environment; and violence was the core of slavery. Finally, violence is the threat behind the rule of law that enables police, as representatives of the state, to keep order, and which too easily devolves into the brutality against people lower in the hierarchy, thus displaying the negative, abusive side of the Rule of Law. Violence has nearly always involved the dehumanized image of one’s enemy, and the practice of violence usually habitualizes dehumanization. For those involved, it is easier to hate and to kill when indigenous populations are viewed as “savages,” or when they believe that “the only good German is a dead German,” as many soldiers did during WWII, or when young black men are perceived as threatening criminals by law enforcement and the media. This dehumanization is a central part of most social ills.

Extraction
The third pillar of capitalism is extraction. Capitalist success depends on access to the resources needed to be extracted through activities like mining, oil drilling, agriculture, and logging and clear-cutting. This principle makes capitalism intensely geographic, and led to the development of previously nascent ideas of private property and state control of territory—over time, states came to control territory so that private land ownership could be defended, and lumber, mining, and mineral extraction rights could be exercised. Perhaps like no other principle, this one shows the interconnections between the capitalist system and our current forms of government. Extraction and exploitation are required in an economy that uses things up—either by burning them or using them to produce something else, which also gets used up. Extraction is further magnified by capitalism’s imperative to grow—endlessly, into new markets, and for the purpose of maintaining profits. Extraction, then, is tied to the consumption economy—capitalism needs people to burn, waste, and dispose more and more resources every day so that the economic activity of extraction can march forward.

Scarcity
The fourth and final pillar is scarcity. The capitalist market depends on the scarcity of goods and services because limited supply creates competition among buyers. When capitalism manufactures a product, it creates one unit of the product, and if more than one person wants that product, then competition arises. This competition among buyers creates demand and pushes up prices and profits, both of which are good for the capitalists. Without scarcity, the market cannot function, and capitalists cannot sell their goods.

The Foundation
Activists, environmentalists, and social theorists have long known that the roots of our current challenges trace back to these four principles. In their writings, these people describe how hierarchy, violence, and dehumanization, for example, provide the roots of racism, sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia. They show that extraction, violence, and scarcity support mining, drilling, and deforestation. In other words, the systemic oppression described by activists and critics derives directly from the capitalist system and its core principles. Just as the strength of capitalism has been an obstacle to social change in the past, the disintegration of the system now presents a tremendous opportunity for social and environmental change. As capitalism crumbles, a new system can be created that does not systemically support racism, misogyny, climate change, war, environmental degradation, and homophobia. The last time this happened, feudalism crumbled and capitalism emerged to reorganize society. This time capitalism will crumble, and it is up to us to shape postcapitalism, which will reorganize society once more.

How Do We Know Capitalism Will Collapse?
Capitalism will not be able to continue on its centuries-long path of gradual, continuous growth because of three discontinuities emanating from its own intrinsic logic. Those discontinuities are: q The inability to price digital products q The inability to create demand among superfluous workers q The inability to account for externalities A break in the capitalist system is inevitable because capitalism must create digital products, eliminate labor wherever possible, and it must never account for externalities. Both at the macroeconomic level and at the individual business level, these three imperatives drive behavior, occur simultaneously, and undermine the foundations of capitalism. Astonishingly, capitalism has no mechanism for dealing with any of these three discontinuities.

The Problem with Digital Products
We are in the midst of a digital revolution which is likely to create a digitalized economy. While this may seem innocuous, the first discontinuity is that markets cannot figure out how to handle digital products—and they never will. To understand what I mean, I need to take a brief detour into how markets set prices under capitalism and show you how those same mechanisms do not, and indeed cannot, work for digital products.

How Prices Are Determined in Capitalism
Capitalist markets set prices using the law of supply and demand. This law states that prices are determined by the ratio of supply to demand. Hence, the higher supply is in relation to demand, the lower prices will go. The more demand increases over supply, the higher prices will go. It is a simple concept. While the pricing mechanism of supply and demand suggests that prices fluctuate as supply and demand change, there is one limit: Prices below the cost of production cannot be sustained. Rational businesses will not produce at a loss, so the cost of production functions as a real-world limit on how far market prices can decline. When businesses opt out because prices go too low, production stops, supply goes down, and that makes prices rise again.

What Happens to Supply and Demand in a Market for Digital Products?
Digital products have a unique feature—they have no cost of production. Think of ebooks, for example. Once an ebook is on a server, it can be downloaded one time or a million times at no difference in cost to the producer. This fact creates a problem for markets in two ways. First, if the cost of production is zero, then there is no downward limit to prices until the product is essentially free. Second, supply is infinite. In other words, the limited supply (or scarcity) on which pricing depends has turned into abundance. There is infinite supply. Under these conditions, the law of supply and demand can no longer accurately price products in the marketplace, and prices fall until the products are free. In other words, the market function on which capitalism depends no longer works. It is one thing to think of ebooks and music, but the reality is that all products are increasingly digitalized and susceptible to the same dynamics. As products continue to take on more and more digital components, or as they become completely digitalized (thereby replacing traditional products), markets in those products will break down—just like it did with ebooks. On the open internet, there are millions of free ebooks, PDFs, videos, and other digital products, thereby demonstrating the reality of a digitally abundant market in which prices collapse to zero. Here is the problem: When products are free, the entire rationale for capitalist investment no longer makes sense. Capitalists don’t invest to sell free products, and they don’t pay workers to produce free products. Capitalism requires the capability of a profit, but no profit is available when the market cannot create a price. The economy can handle a few product categories collapsing in price, but as digitalization spreads to construction, cars, clothing, and even food production—all of which are currently happening—capitalism ceases to function in any meaningful way.

Automation Eliminates Labor
The second discontinuity is automation and robotic production. Here is an example of the impact: In 2016, Adidas announced that it is opening a new production facility in Germany to replace some factories in southeast Asia. They are not doing this by reducing labor costs—they are doing it by eliminating labor costs. They are replacing people with robots. The new factory will ultimately produce 500,000 pairs of shoes per year, and it will employ only 160 people, none of whom actually make the shoes. For capitalists, production without labor is a dream. The problem is that while production robots do not need to be paid, they also do not buy things. Capitalism depends on consumption to drive its economic engine, so if no one has a job, they also have no income; and if they have no income, who is going to buy the products?

Climate Change—The Inescapable Reality
The third discontinuity is the inability to account for externalities. Externalities are the byproducts, garbage, waste, and pollution that a company generates but doesn’t have to pay for. Externalities come in the form of pollution, systemic financial risk, social problems, disease and debilitation, and wasted energy. For all of capitalism’s history, these externalities were treated as unfortunate byproducts which were largely someone else’s problem—the people downstream, the government, the poor and poverty-stricken, or the indigenous inhabitants. And they remained ignored as someone else’s problem so long as capitalists didn’t need to pay for them. Climate change is caused by centuries of pollution diffusing through the atmosphere and trapping heat, much like a greenhouse does. This pollution has always been treated by capitalism as an externality. But now that climate change is affecting everyone everywhere on earth, and scientists tell us that we are nearing the point where the balance is tipped and continued climate change will take on its own life, the pollution causing climate change has ceased to be an externality. Instead, it is a fact demonstrating that the externalities must be accounted for. There is no escape—not for the wealthy, not for the poor, not for business, labor, or consumers, and not for anyone in any given country. It cannot be made into someone else’s problem anymore. It cannot be privatized. Eventually, we swelter together or perish in catastrophic climate events. In essence, climate change means capitalism has run its course.

The Inevitable Collapse of Capitalism
One would think that, given these three realities (digitalization, automation, and climate change), the capitalists would change course. Maybe, but here is the problem—they cannot help themselves. The capitalist system intrinsically requires all actors to consistently drive costs of production down in order to increase profit margins and stay competitive. As digitalization happens, they all have to digitalize to keep up. The same is true of robotic production—anyone producing without robots will not be able to compete. Likewise, capitalist elites cannot even acknowledge climate change because then they would have to acknowledge that the global capitalist project has brought humankind to the brink of collapse. For business, incurring the expense of unilateral action on climate change makes it impossible to compete. Capitalism cannot stop its own relentless juggernaut because to do so is to repudiate capitalism at its very essence. This is what makes the collapse inevitable. Digitalization, robotic production, and ongoing pollution in the form of greenhouse gases will continue to feed the three discontinuities, and there is no way for capitalism to stop it. In essence, capitalism has established a race toward its own end. On one hand, climate change could lead us to a catastrophic collapse, probably through a series of catastrophic events, such that capitalism cannot continue because society, or the planet itself, is radically changed. On the other hand, capitalism careens toward a technological future that undermines its own principles, and a new type of society arises from that challenge. One way or another, capitalism comes to an end.

The Four Transformations in Detail: Our Postcapitalist Opportunity
The opportunity for transformation lies in the earliest possible move to postcapitalist principles. We need to articulate, celebrate, and advance these ideals, and while they are inevitable, it is not inevitable that humanity will be in good shape when it does. To review, the four transformations are as follows: q Capitalist hierarchy is replaced by postcapitalist egalitarian networks. q Capitalist violent coercion is replaced by postcapitalist voluntary participation. q Capitalist extraction is replaced by postcapitalist conversion. q Capitalist scarcity is replaced by postcapitalist abundance. By replacing the old capitalist principles, the new postcapitalist principles offer the possibility of a completely new way of organizing society. Words are one thing, but what do these ideas actually mean? And how will they change our society?

Transformation 1: The New Networked World
Networks are the opposite of hierarchy. Rather than hierarchical offices, which outlast the individuals who occupy them, networks are made up of relationships and connections between real people. In a network, when the person disconnects, all their relationships do as well. When networks become the dominant mode of organizing society, thereby replacing hierarchy, our whole way of thinking about the world will change with it. In a hierarchy, the predominant social currency is power as expressed in the exercise of the power of the office. In a network, the predominant social currency is influence, as expressed in one’s ability to influence opinion, ideas, and people. Whereas hierarchy spurs competition for the limited number of positions of power, networks open the possibility of unlimited connections and an abundance of influences from many different sources. Thus, networks create a completely different mental model of the world—one in which power dynamics are almost incomprehensible because there is no hierarchical mental model to support it. Without any sense of the privilege of office, what is the value of creating an imagined office of racial or ethnic supremacy? In networks, the projection of influence occurs through connection, not through domination. New mental models actually do change the system of oppression in the minds of everyone.

Transformation 2: Voluntary Collaborative Production
Voluntary production collaboratives like Wikipedia, Linux, and Sugar CRM are on the forefront of the rejection of violence and capitalistic coercion. Collaborative production communities create products because they want to participate in them. They are totally voluntary, they produce products of great value, and the products are usually free. Because they are free, however, no one can exert control. Rather, these communities create and adopt standards for participation collaboratively and largely self-police for compliance. Postcapitalism offers the chance to model society based on voluntary participation rather than coercion, and in so doing, to subvert the ideology of violence. Voluntary collaborative production means that people are doing what they want to do, not what they are forced to do by a method of organizing society that they never asked for or wanted to be a part of. Although it may be difficult to imagine, poverty begins to lose meaning in such a world. Labor equity issues vanish. People are doing what they want to do.

Transformation 3: Conversion
 Where capitalism must extract and exploit, postcapitalism will convert. The difference is that while extraction uses things up, conversion does not. Conversion is what happens in the digital world. We convert sunlight to power, we convert digits to words, we convert air into life when we breathe it. The source for conversion is in infinite supply—sunlight, digits, and air. If I get some, it doesn’t mean there is less for you. We don’t sell the source; we simply experience it. The ethic of conversion completely transforms our use of resources, what we need, and how we get it, and brings to a close the ongoing juggernaut of resource exploitation around the world. Instead of fighting or competing over a scarce resource, the economy is driven by these conversions. When the paradigm shifts, we will find more and more opportunities for conversion of abundant resources rather than exploitation of limited ones. Capitalist activities like pollution and conquest come to an end because they are valueless, and hence, conversion is the key factor putting an end to climate change and the war on indigenous cultures in the new postcapitalist world.

Transformation 4: Abundance
 Finally, capitalist scarcity disappears and is replaced by abundance, and this change brings an end to the deadly competition of capitalism. In fact, the whole idea of competition will fail to make sense anymore. There will always be enough, and we will always have it accessible. Instead of markets pricing scarce goods and services, they will simply be available on an asneeded basis, whether it is food, transportation, or housing. It will be freely given because the new postcapitalist wealth will not be based on “transfers” but rather on the engagement and conversion of the abundance that is given to us. This can be the basis for the elimination of poverty and oppression of all kinds.

These Principles Change Everything
 Just as the pillars of capitalism—hierarchy, violence, extraction, and scarcity—form the foundation of the world we have today, replacing them with networks, collaborative production, conversion, and abundance will lead to a very different, postcapitalist world. The exact outcome of that world is not known, but if these pillars and principles do in fact change, there are many new possibilities. We will explore a few now.

The End of Systemic Fear
 Consider the four principles that underlie capitalism: hierarchy, violence, extraction, and scarcity. How can one view the world through anything other than a lens of fear? That some people do is a testament to their strength, their good fortune in life, and the good work they have done to achieve success. But it doesn’t change the reality that the main tone of life in such a world is fear—fear that I won’t get my share, fear that someone will take mine from me, fear that my opportunity will disappear. This fear is critical to understand because it is the emotional source feeding sexism, racism, homophobia, and xenophobia. It underlies war and competition. It makes us forsake our fellow human beings, forsake the natural world, and even forsake our own lives in an endless pursuit of an unachievable security. Fear is sustained by capitalism’s hierarchical worldview, the competition resulting from scarcity, and of course, the violence endemic to the system. Where is the fear in egalitarian networks, voluntary collaborative networks, conversion, and abundance? How does oppression sustain itself without fear? Without scarcity? Without competition for survival? Postcapitalism will transform the core principles of society and it will be experienced as a relief from fear. When fear dissipates, it is possible for the whole apparatus of systemic oppression to fall away.

The End of Climate Change
The conversion economy is going to replace the extraction economy; the only question is if it will happen soon enough to stop climate change before it becomes irreversible, or worse, before it becomes self-reinforcing. According to climate scientists, runaway climate change takes hold at an average temperature increase of two degrees Celsius, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit. They also tell us we are halfway there. This problem cannot be fixed by doing less of what causes it; it will only be stopped by meeting society’s needs in a qualitatively different manner. The conversion economy converts highly abundant resources such as sunlight into the energy we need, so that in the conversion economy, there is always enough energy, there is no scarcity, and there is no pollution. That is how climate change can be solved. But let’s be clear here: The change that is necessary isn’t just a new technology. Improvements in the power conversion technology of solar is important, but if deployed within a capitalist paradigm, it either will not work or will cause related problems that will perpetuate the climate problem. Building solar farms is not a solution, putting solar panels on your roof is. Solar farms disconnect production from consumption (a capitalist paradigm), whereas the rooftop production moves production to consumption in a new postcapitalist paradigm. In other words, we need to move past the capitalist paradigm and into a postcapitalist conversion economy. When this happens, just think of the possibilities! With no extraction and no scarcity, the geography of mineral resources becomes irrelevant. There’s no need for big state control, or pipelines, or power plants. Mining comes to an end. Clear-cutting is no longer necessary, nor is it even profitable. To make it happen and to fulfill this promise, we will need to work at it. Universal

Basic Income—The End of Poverty and Coerced Labor
Digitalization and the free economy of the future will inevitably clash with the capitalist economy of the present; transition periods are like that. As an answer to job losses, poverty, and the need for consumer demand, many people are proposing a universal basic income. The idea is that every human being receives a stipend each month for simply being alive. No work, no minimum wage, no strings attached. You get a check from the government every month because you are alive. Basic income is an obvious answer to poverty, unemployment, and maintaining consumer purchasing power. But equally, it creates a basis for the flowering of art, creativity, and entrepreneurship. Think of it—what would you do if you didn’t have to worry about being out on the street without income, nowhere to live, and no food to eat? What business might you try? What art might you create? Would you just hang out with friends and enjoy life? Universal basic income has the power to unleash the passion of creativity and the joy of leisure without making it subservient to the commoditized world of the market. You will never have to work at a job you hate just to make ends meet. Basic income is just one of the ideas coming from the postcapitalist world. It is an idea to explore and to advocate. New ideas are also being developed by many theorists, activists, and intellectuals. Fostering these ideas through creation, networks, and advocacy is the goal of the postcapitalist project today.

 Direct Democracy and the End of Power
 Mandates The end of hierarchy as an organizing principle also means the end of hierarchical representative democracy. Hierarchy created government offices with their duties and powers, and whether intended or not, these offices have effectively ensured that government does the business of the powerful elites long before it thinks of doing the so-called “people’s business.” In other words, representative democracy is uniquely effective at supporting capitalism. The digitalized, postcapitalist world of the future will likely replace representative democracy with direct democracy, wherein citizens vote on laws and bills directly using the internet. For example, Congress (or Parliament) might be expected to develop and negotiate the bills, but approval or denial comes from the people themselves. The digitalized, networked world enables the mechanism, and the postcapitalist collaborative production model normalizes that kind of communication and activity. Personally, I think this new model is coming sooner than most people think. As government fails to do its job, ballot initiatives are moving away from issues of charter or constitution and becoming the defacto mechanism of the people to have a voice. Combine this frustration with the breakdown of the supporting structures of capitalism, and it would appear that direct democracy is not far away—despite its potentially enormous logistical and participatory challenges.

The Power of Ideas—Turning Promise Into Reality
Whatever we may hope for in the transformation of the four principles of capitalism, the hopes are only possibilities. Activism and fighting the powers that be will not be effective. Resistance is not enough. We have to start with the engaged readers, the thinkers, and the theorists—people like you. We need to create a conversation and a thought environment in which the new ideas become the basic assumptions of reality, while the old principles wither away. Historical shifts don’t happen in movements; they happen when dominant ideas change. This is not a battle over an issue. Rather, we are in a war for history. Postcapitalism represents the most challenging notion in social theory today. It affects every aspect of society—religion, social structures, politics, economics, safety nets, military motivations, and business. Careers will be affected. Cities will change. New methods of living will make our present look as quaint to the future as the peasantry of old looks to us today. A new world is going to emerge no matter what; the question is whether it tips into dystopic possibilities or turns toward opportunities for a better world. To shape it into the better world, we need to understand the most exciting opportunities and most innovative possibilities that are emerging—and they are all over the place! We just need to know, explore, read, and think for ourselves about what could be. We need imagination. We need ideas. So, the first order of business is simple:

Download your own FREE sampler of Speculations on Postcapitalism.
You will love reading these essays. I promise it will take your mind to new places so you can see new possibilities. The sampler is a selection of 8 of the 23 essays in the book. The titles include:
- A Guide to Our Future
-The Coming Collapse of Capitalism q Supercomputing: A Capitalist response to the Postcapitalist Threat - Does Postcapitalism mean Post-Democracy? 
-Postcapitalism, Networks, and the new Post-State world - A Postcapitalist Solution to Climate Change
-Abundant Digital Food
Problems and Opportunities in the Universal Basic Income Dream Download it and read them. The essays collected here are the foundation for the road ahead. You can get these essays absolutely free here.

 Allow me to put this in perspective...

Today, even as you read this manifesto, capitalism is reshaping itself to maintain power in response to digitalization. So-called “platform capitalism” is becoming what steel and railroads were in the “robber baron” age. Companies are jockeying for monopolistic control of the platforms on which all these networks will exist. You can see it in Amazon, Facebook, and Netflix, for example. Or, they are moving to consolidate control over the digital pipes that tie us together—companies like Comcast and CenturyLink are trying to gain control in what they euphemistically call their own version of “preserving an open internet.” Still others are fighting to attain ownership of genes they did not produce and of water that is not theirs. These moves are standard for capitalism trying to control a market in monopolistic fashion. If they win, the old principles probably endure. And, if they win, the primary reason will be the lack of compelling alternative ideas.
It is our ideas—yours, mine, writers still to publish, and those of the general public—that will ultimately shape the new postcapitalist world. Ideas shape the opportunity in all the areas of change most people care about. For example: q What climate change activist would not like to rewrite the rules for the global economy? That chance is here. q What racial justice activist would not like to build a society on egalitarian, nonhierarchical principles? We have that opportunity now. q What peace activist would not like to eliminate the underlying drive for war—natural resource acquisition and control? The chance to do this is now. q Who would not want to end poverty through a basic income for all? We are on the verge of this revolution. It all depends on our ideas. Let’s create better ideas. The time is now. 

17.4.17

Robert Skidelsky: The Crisis of Capitalism. Keynes Versus Marx

The Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 45, No. 3, January 2010 pp. 321­335 | Monday, February 01, 2010

John Maynard Keynes keeps returning, like the ageing diva who goes on giving farewell performances. What does this tell us? First, it tells us that in economics there are no final victories and defeats. Rather, economic doctrines ebb and flow, obedient to changes in consciousness and in the world. But, secondly, it tells us that as the world changes, so do its structures of power. The rise and fall of different schools of economics is related to shifts in the balance of social and economic power. Marx understood this, hence his place in my title. My purpose here is not to make the case for Keynes, but to consider the passage of his ideas from acceptance to rejection in the context of changing preoccupations and conditions. In this I follow the lead of the eminent Indian economist Amir Kumar Dasgupta, who wrote ‘A system of economic theory evolves in response to questions that are provoked by a given set of circumstances in the economy. As circumstances change, or people’s attitude to them changes, questions are revised, and a new system springs up’ (Dasgupta 1985:4). Dasgupta is right to distinguish between changes in circumstances and changes in people’s attitudes to these changes. There is a large gap between the two. This approach will give us some sense of how durable the modest resurgence of Keynes’s economics today will prove to be. Keynes ended The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money with the famous words: ‘But soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests which are dangerous for good or evil’ (Keynes 1936: 383­4). Anyone involved in the production of ideas has to believe this, unless he is being paid by someone to produce the ideas. In today’s world, the chief manufactory of ideas is the Academy. Pure research has long been recognised as an independent intellectual pursuit; its hallmark, disinterestedness. Its purpose is the search for truth. The pecuniary interest of scholars is not directly involved in either the direction of their enquiry or its results (Collini 2009). Sociology of Success At the same time, there is what Schumpeter called the ‘sociology of success.’ Put crudely, why are some ideas acceptable, and others rejected or marginalised? In the natural sciences this question is relatively easy to answer: newer ideas bring us closer to reality than the older ones. For this reason, quantum physics replaced classical physics (Cartwright 1999:2). Reality is unchanging, only the theory changes as it improves our understanding of reality. Predictive power is the ultimate test of the truth of a scientific hypothesis. In social sciences this is much less true. The natural world does not interfere with one’s observation of it; the social world does. It is the changeability of the object being studied which demarcates social sciences from natural sciences. Social reality is constantly shifting, problems crucial at one time become irrelevant at another. As a result, propositions in social science do not satisfy the ‘universality criterion’. They are limited in time and place. As Dasgupta (1985: 1­2) points out, theories in economics are independent of each other, they do not supersede each other. Theories in the social sciences can rarely be successfully confirmed or falsified, except briefly. Progress in economics consists of greater precision in stating ideas, not the greater explanatory power of the ideas themselves; and the precision may be at the expense of the explanation. In economics, much more than in physics, the research agenda and structure of power within the profession reflect the structure of power outside it. They have the character of ideologies. And this, of course, was precisely Marx’s contention, when he wrote “What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class” (MarxEngels Selected Works, 1962:52). Power & Ideas 4/17/2017 Robert Skidelsky ­ The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes Versus Marx http://www.skidelskyr.com/print/the­crisis­of­capitalism­keynes­versus­marx 2/9 The relationship between power and ideas is not a simple base­superstructure one. Ideas are not at the mercy of events in any straightforward way. The disciplines which produce theories exhibit stability through time, in their concepts, techniques, and language. That is why paradigm shifts are rare. It is true that disciplines turn to new topics. But there is no need to relate all new topics to changes in the world. Theorists might simply get bored with the old topics, feeling that debate about them has reached a dead end. Change of topic is also connected with generational change within a discipline. It is nearer to our theme to say that ideas change when the facts change. (Keynes is supposed to have said, but probably didn’t ­ ‘When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?’). Up to a point this must be true. But it presupposes a direct relationship between ideas and reality which is plainly false. Facts can be interpreted in different ways. He who controls the interpretation controls the ideas. This brings us to the question of power. Adapting Steven Lukes (1974), one may think of ideas as a form of ‘soft power’, which structures our debates about reality. Alternatively, and more comprehensively, they may be seen as shaping our consciousness –the way we interpret our world. But just because ideas are produced in institutions, we cannot ignore questions about the hard power behind the soft power. Who finances the institutions from which ideas spring? Who finances the dissemination of ideas in popular form –media, think tanks? What are the incentives facing the producers, disseminators, and popularisers of ideas even in a society in which discussion is ‘free’? In short, what is the agenda of business? It is reasonable to see business as the hard power behind the soft power of ideas, not because the business community speaks with one voice, or because there are not other centres of hard power (e.g. government) but because it is the main source of the money without which the intellectual estate would wither and die. Ideas are thus an independent source of authority. Practical men –politicians, businessmen, civil servants –are consumers, not producers, of ideas. This gives the producers of ideas considerable latitude vis­à­vis their users. The vested interests are in no position –even were they capable of it ­ to dictate the precise form of the intellectual defence offered for their preferences. Thus the economist’s justification of the free market is likely to be both more general and also more circumscribed than that offered by the business class. For example, economists have almost always opposed protectionism and monopoly. Ideas are thus capable of making selfinterest seem more enlightened. Assertion of the independence of ideas is a necessary modification of crude Marxism, which I dare say Marx himself would have accepted. Nevertheless, in the Marxist scheme, the intellectual class, like the state, attains only ‘relative autonomy’; and ideas rarely overturn the perception or promotion of self­interest, however much they may modify its expression. Practical men like nothing better than to have their prejudices dressed up in scientific language. Ultimately the ideas in power serve the interests of the class in power; under capitalism, this is the capitalist class. Ricardian Foundations Keynes strongly believed in the autonomy of ideas; he saw his own mission as being to correct ‘intellectual error’. On 1 January 1935, he wrote to Bernard Shaw “To understand my state of mind you have to know that I believe myself to be writing a book on economic theory, which will largely revolutionise…the way the world thinks about economic problems…In particular, the Ricardian foundations of Marxism will be knocked away” (Skidelsky 2003: 528). What did he mean by knocking away the ‘Ricardian foundations of Marxism?’ Ricardian economics was famously ‘an inquiry into the laws which determine the division of the produce of industry among the classes who concur in its formation’. The force of these laws was considered to be on a par with the laws of nature, immune to modification ­ except temporarily ­ by public action: hence the case for laissez­faire. Ricardo’s ‘iron law of wages’ –which held that wages could never rise above subsistence – was based on Mathus’s law of population. Marx substituted surplus value for surplus population. Malthusian population cycles became Marxist employment cycles: capitalist profits could be maintained only by constantly creating and re­creating a ‘reserve army of the unemployed’. For Marx, ‘bourgeois economics’ simply provided a protective belt for exploitation, 4/17/2017 Robert Skidelsky ­ The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes Versus Marx http://www.skidelskyr.com/print/the­crisis­of­capitalism­keynes­versus­marx 3/9 by proving that wages were bound to be forced down to subsistence. For Marxist –and perhaps for most socialists of Keynes’s age, it was the encroachment of wages on profits which explained the mass unemployment of the interwar years. Keynes’s overthrow of the ‘Ricardian foundations’ consisted in the claim that production and employment could be limited by lack of effective demand; and that in most circumstances, and particularly when unemployment was heavy, could be boosted by government action to increase effective demand. In making this claim, Keynes did not so much controvert the logic of classical reasoning, as to limit its domain of applicability. It applied only to the ‘special case’ of full employment. The ‘general case’ was one in which full employment was only one of a number of possible positions of equilibrium, and not the most likely. In the ‘special case’, the unfettered market economy was normally at full employment; in the ‘general’ case, there is no such presumption, full employment being attained only in moments of excitement, and by a chance conjuncture of favourable conditions. . Profit drives Keynes’s capitalist engine just as much as it does Marx’s. But whereas for Marx, and the Ricardians, profits are determined by the business class’s share of a fixed cake, for Keynes they depend on business expectations of the future size of the cake. For Keynes the class struggle over division of the cake affects profit expectations only at full employment; for Marx the class struggle determined the profit share at all times. For Marx, a ‘reserve army of the unemployed’ has to be created whenever wages encroached on profits; for Keynes heavy unemployment dampens profit expectations by reducing the expected demand for goods. Marx believed that the Ricardian class struggle for shares of the national product would be settled decisively in favour of labour: capitalism would be abolished, and with it the profits of capitalists and rents of landlords. But Marx failed to see the unavoidable consequences of the economic and technological revolution which was going on before his eyes. These consequences, as summarized by Lowe (1965:192), were “the shift of political power to the middle classes and the rise of strong labour unions…capable of making their growing aspirations felt under a system of widening franchise…This not only democratized the spirit of modern government but created the new administrative key position for a progressive control of economic by political forces”. In other words, Marx missed the growth of a social balance between the ‘countervailing powers’ of business, labour, and government, which put the revolution off the agenda. At the same time, the business class lost its ability to enforce the real wage reductions necessary to its continued profitability, except in the extreme cases of Germany and Italy. As a result mass unemployment became endemic in the developed world. This was the setting in which Keynes’s analysis of the economic problem in terms of ‘under­employment equilibrium’ could gain traction. It promised to break the social stasis by invoking the economic power of the state. Non­Marxist Explanation In presenting the unemployment problem as one of insufficient demand, rather than struggle over supply, Keynes was giving a non­Marxist explanation of mass unemployment. To say that a market economy had no internal tendency to full employment was to make the case for government action to secure full employment. Although his theory undercut the case for socialism, it opened up the road for government ‘management’ of the macro­economy to ensure a quasi­optimal equilibrium. There would be no government interference with managerial prerogatives or decision­making; the government’s task was to guarantee full employment. The attainment of full employment of potential resources would be good for both profits and wages. Such a theory, I suggest, could only have become the basis of policy under conditions of social balance. Keynes’s economics was the economics of the middle way; the best deal that liberal capitalism could expect in a world veering towards the political extremes. Keynes thought of his economics as the economics of the general interest, for it encompassed, while transcending, the sectional interests of both capital and labour. I believe this to be true: it was the least ideological, the least politicised, of all economic doctrines. His political genius was to see that when the problem was one of unused capacity, redistribution was a minor question, which could be postponed till later. But by the same token, his economics threw little light on what would happen to class shares of wages and profits when his own policies achieved full employment in conditions of strong union organisation. In such a situation, would the government need to recreate Marx’s ‘reserve army of the 4/17/2017 Robert Skidelsky ­ The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes Versus Marx http://www.skidelskyr.com/print/the­crisis­of­capitalism­keynes­versus­marx 4/9 unemployed’ to restrain wage demands? Or would it be forced to inflate to keep profits racing ahead of wages? The latter is what Jacob Viner assumed would happen when society got accustomed to full employment. Keynes himself admitted that he had “no solution…to the wages problem in a full employment economy” (Keynes (1945:385). Marxists, too, believed that attempts to overcome the class struggle by inflation would bring only temporary relief. To emphasise the political work which Keynes’s economics did should not lead one to underestimate its theoretical originality. It was not intended to explain just the Great Depression. It was intended to explain why a decentralised market economy was unable to exploit the full potentialities of production except in ‘moments of excitement’. His original contribution was to demonstrate that it lacked any internal mechanism for the maintenance of full employment. Behind this lay a profound insight: that the classical theory of the selfregulating market was true only when market participants had reliable knowledge of future events. Classical models were inapplicable to situations of uncertainty. But Keynes claimed that uncertainty was the typical situation facing the investor. “The whole object of the accumulation of wealth”, Keynes wrote, “ is to produce results, or potential results, at a comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus the fact that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economic theory”. Over a large swathe of our forward­pointing decisions, we have “no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever” (Keynes 1937:113). Models which assumed that we had calculable probabilities abstracted from the problem of breakdown caused by not knowing what tomorrow would bring. Risk &Uncertainty To translate into today’s language: central to Keynes’s epistemology is the distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk is when probabilities can be measured; uncertainty exists when no such measure is possible. The existence of irreduceable uncertainty is Keynes’s explanation for the mediocre secular performance and periodic breakdowns of a decentralised economy. By contrast, all the mathematical models underlying our recently­crashed financial system assumed that it was possible to measure risk and therefore insure or hedge against loss. Individuals could miscalculate the odds, but, given the assumption of rationality, their mistakes would be randomised. Keynes’s theory explains why such models were bound to promise much more than they could deliver. What was it that rendered large parts of the future impervious to probabilistic calculation? Keynes gave the example of an apple endowed with ‘human’ characteristics. Newtonian physics tells us that it will always fall to the ground, at a speed dictated by the force exerted on it divided by its mass. But no such prediction can be made about the ‘human’ apple. “It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple’s motives, on whether it is worth while falling to the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of the apple on how far it was from the centre of the earth (Keynes 1938:303) Some part of the uncertainty attached to the speed of the apple’s fall can be put down to mistakes on the apple’s part. However, the main ‘human’ characteristic with which Keynes equips his apple is ‘motives’ and ‘intentions’. It is these which break the link between economics and physics, and which make economics a ‘moral’ and not a ‘natural’ science. Keynes’s point is that economics “deals with introspection and values….with motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties”. The future can’t be predicted, because the future is changeable. It is changeable, in large part, because it is what we choose to make it. As Paul Davidson (2007:33) puts it, the economic world is ‘non­ergodic’. This view implies a large restriction on the applicability of econometrics. Basically Keynes believed it could be applied only to those fields in which risk is measurable. This excluded most of the risks incurred in investment markets. The main technique we adopt to cope with a ‘non­ergodic’ universe is to transform uncertainty into calculable risk by giving it numbers. This is what mathematical forecasting models do, using some version of Bayes theorem to transform prior into posterior probabilities. This gives us the assurance we need to invest. But it is a fake assurance. While repeated betting on horses allows you to update your ‘priors’ to match the ‘true’ merits of 4/17/2017 Robert Skidelsky ­ The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes Versus Marx http://www.skidelskyr.com/print/the­crisis­of­capitalism­keynes­versus­marx 5/9 the horses, no amount of data on past economic events brings you any closer to their true probabilities in the future because the future is bound to be different from the past. What we do is to use mathematics to invent a world of calculable probabilities which we take to be an accurate reflection of the real world. Thinking about the future as risky rather than uncertain is not foolish. In fact it is the only rational basis of individual action. It is also compatible, as Keynes notes, with a considerable measure of stability. Mathematical forecasts can shape the future they claim to predict, by shaping our expectations. They may produce what economists call ‘bootstrap’ paths or equilibria, paths which are what they are not because the world is what it is, but because beliefs about the world are what they are. They tell a story about the future which gives confidence, as long as long as nothing happens to shake confidence in the story. But prices thus formed are liable to ‘sudden and violent change’, precisely because there is no firm basis of conviction to hold them steady (Keynes 1937:14:114­5). Keynes puts uncertainty to work to explain three leading features of economic life: the frequent breakdowns in the investment machine, the persistence of poverty in large parts of the world, and the possibility of ‘underemployment equilibrium’. Let me just say a few words about the last two. Poverty & Market Economy Both the persistence of poverty and the failure of a market economy to regain full employment quickly after a shock were connected in Keynes’s mind with the role of money as a store of value. He thought that throughout history the desire to hoard savings had been stronger than the desire to invest them, because at all times vague panic fears lay below the surface, denting our optimism in the future, and creating a permanent bias towards preserving existing value rather than creating new value. Keynes believed that investment came in bursts of optimism which he called ‘animal spirits’. We can trace these investment upsurges in history –from the railway boom of the 19th century to the dot. com boom which ended in 2000. But normally people preferred to hoard rather than invest their money, that is to say, there was a permanently high level of liquidity preference which exerted a permanent upward pressure on interest rates. Hence, Keynes’s support for the medieval usury laws which he saw as an attempt to prevent people making money by hoarding money. Keynes’s theory of economic history was influenced, perhaps over influenced, by Jevons’s famous description of India as the ‘sink of the precious metals’. “The history of India at all times”, he wrote in the General Theory “has provided an example of a country impoverished by a preference for liquidity amounting to so strong a passion that even an enormous and chronic influx of the precious metals has been insufficient to bring down the rate of interest to a level which was compatible with the growth of real wealth” (Keynes 1936:385). Keynes believed that from ancient times onwards, the Orient’s propensity to hoard influxes of precious metals had set the Occident a permanent deflationary problem. Shortage of gold in the west had been relieved from time to time by discoveries of gold and silver in the New World, and by Western seizure of Oriental temple and palace hoards. He would thus have seen the global imbalances of today as the reappearance of an ancient pattern. Uncertainty also lies at the heart of Keynes’s theory of persisting unemployment, though this was less developed. As Axel Leijonhufvud (1969) has pointed out the main innovation of the General Theory was to create a model in which the system reacts to a disturbance by quantity not wage level or price level adjustments. Following a shock, output and prices both adjust. But prices adjust slower than output because people don’t know what the disequilibrium price is. So they trade at disequilibrium prices. There is no auctioneer to establish a ‘vector of market clearing prices’ before trade starts. Further, only in the very long term need long­run interest rates conform to underlying physical transformation possibilities and inter­temporal household preferences. In the short run, speculation, in security markets will make them diverge from levels that obtain under full information about transformation possibilities and ‘tastes’. Hoarding and dis­hoarding are a concomitant of this speculative activity. Uncertainty may thus cause the real wage and long term rate of interest to remain for years above the rates needed for full employment. In short, uncertainty not only brings about periodic collapses; it removes the economy’s postulated ‘self­adjustment’ mechanisms. The listing ship does not automatically right itself. 4/17/2017 Robert Skidelsky ­ The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes Versus Marx http://www.skidelskyr.com/print/the­crisis­of­capitalism­keynes­versus­marx 6/9 Public Investment &Full Employment Keynes’s answer –the only logical one following from his analysis – is for the state to ensure enough investment and/or consumption in the economy to maintain continuous full employment. A steady stream of public investment would, in particular, reduce the domain of uncertainty to modest dimensions. Such investment would not necessarily be profit­maximising. But provided it yielded positive returns, there would be a gain. If markets had perfect information, public investment would be inefficient. But with uncertainty, there is a gain as against having no state investment at all, because of the losses due to uncertainty. Note here that it was essential to Keynes’s purpose to establish the possibility of under­employment equilibrium, in both the long and the short run, to justify a role for government to improve the equilibrium. A theory of cycles, even of deep cycles, would not have done the job, since it was always open to business­cycle theorists to argue that cycles were part of the normal mechanism of economic progress and that therefore government action to dampen or prevent cycles was a sin against progress itself. Schumpeter’s theory ‘of creative destruction’ did amount to exactly this. An economy stuck for decades, even centuries, in an under­employment equilibrium was much more plausibly an object of special government attention than one whose dynamic exuberance occasionally brought about a collapse. Keynes claimed his theory was more ‘general’ than classical economics because it encompassed a variety of economic situations exhibiting different states of knowledge. The question is: how central is the Keynes case? If the capitalist growth engine is subject to genuine ontological indeterminacy then its mediocre performance and frequent breakdowns are explained. If, on the other hand, uncertainty can be plausibly modelled as an information problem, to be overcome by learning and by more efficient data processing, then Keynes’s case is marginalised, and the classical theory is reinstated as the central case. The comeback of classical economics consisted in marginalising the Keynes case, and reinserting its own theory of the self­regulating market based on ‘perfect information’ as the ‘general case’. Keynesianism dominated the political economy of developed economies from the 1950s through to the mid 1970s. As Thomas Palley (2009:3­4) argues, ‘economic policy was designed to achieve full employment, and the economy was characterized by a system in which wages grew with productivity. This configuration created a virtuous circle of growth. Rising wages meant robust aggregate demand, which contributed to full employment. Full employment in turn provided an incentive to invest, which raised productivity, therefore supporting higher wages’. The New Economic Paradigm After 1980, a new economic paradigm established itself based on ‘asset price inflation (equities and housing); widening income inequality; detachment of worker wages from productivity growth; rising household and corporate leverage ratios measured respectively in debt/income and debt/equity ratios; a strong dollar; trade deficits; disinflation or low inflation; and manufacturing job losses’. Workers were pressured on four sides: by globalization, reduction in the size of government, increase of labour market flexibility and retreat from full employment (Palley 2009:4­5). With the membership and influence of trade unions sharply reduced and government weakened, business became the sole prevailing power. This brings one close to the conditions of the Industrial Revolution, analysed by Marx. What accounts for this radical shift in ideas and policies? Part of the explanation is almost too easy. We are never content with what we’ve got. With the achievement of full employment and vigorous growth under the Keynesian aegis it became easy to forget what life had been like before Keynes. It became natural to assume that full employment was the normal state, and forget that it was achieved by conscious design. The ills of the market were forgotten: it was the ills of government which commanded attention. In economic theory terms this meant shifting attention from the problem of insufficient demand to the problem of inefficient supply – a return, that is, to the classical agenda of economics. More specifically, the key reasons for the shift (though not, exhaustive, and not in isolation from each other) are: 4/17/2017 Robert Skidelsky ­ The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes Versus Marx http://www.skidelskyr.com/print/the­crisis­of­capitalism­keynes­versus­marx 7/9 On the intellectual side, the rehabilitation of the market and the denigration of the state. One can tell the fall of Keynesianism as a purely intellectual story, a counter­revolution in economics, starting with Friedman and adaptive expectations and ending with the new classicals and rational expectations, real business theory, efficient market theory, etc. A major casualty on the way was Keynes’s fundamental insight of uncertainty, and the associated role of money as a store of value. The upshot was a mathematical reinstatement of the classical theory of the self­regulating market. The rehabilitation of market didn’t entirely depend on new classical models. There has been a notable revival of Schumpeterian models –capitalism depended on creative destruction, heroic entrepreneurs. In this Promethean perspective, too much stability destroys capitalism’s dynamic, so we must, in Meghnad Desai’s graphic phrase ‘ride the surf and learn to enjoy it’. Coupled with this was the justification of super­profits as reward for super­enterprise. Right­wing think tanks and journalists simplified and popularised the academic celebration of markets and revulsion against big government. Keynesianism’s failure to solve the Ricardo/Marx problem. Keynesian policy had created the full employment economy which the classical economists had assumed was ‘natural’. And in such an economy, as both Ricardo and Marx had pointed out, there was a unique rate of profit compatible with equilibrium. The Ricardians had explained inter­war unemployment by the encroachment of wages on profits. In the 1970s, Keynesian governments used inflation to suppress a rise in the ‘natural rate’ of unemployment, and then resorted to incomes policy to suppress inflation. From this perspective, inflation was a ‘vent for social conflict’: behind the increase in the quantity of money was the conflict between classes for income shares; behind incomes policy the aim of restoring the profit share. There is some evidence of a “fundamental decline in profitability which occurred in several countries in the 1970s, itself a reflection of growing labour strength a time of heightened international competition” (Gough 1975:87). The failure of the Keynesian managers to prevent the encroachment of wages on capital in the full employment, unionised economy they had created, destroyed the political utility of Keynesian economics and paved the way for the counter­revolution in policy. The theoretical language of monetarism provided anti­Keynesians with the intellectual cover to pursue a policy of destroying union control over the wage bargain by creating mass unemployment. The political shift against trade unionism. The lack of a good theory relating employment to prices, the big weakness in the Keynesian political economy, meant that governments in 1960s­70s relied on incomes policy to achieve their overfull employment targets. This not only led to stagflation as described by Friedman, but by increasing the monopoly power of organized labour, turned people against trade unions, even their own members. Trade unions, in Great Britain at least, threatened to become the prevailing power. Labour Government programmes in early 1970s envisaged an economy run by the government and the trade unions, with only a minor role for private business. Thatcherism was the political reaction to this. The change in the structure of the economy. How much of this was due to autonomous technological innovation, and how much due to policies to restore profits? I know of no good theory which endogenises technological change. But two structural changes seem to be key: o Consolidation of big business and banking, and shift to a service economy. In the much enlarged financial sector, the degree of concentration has increased­e.g 5 banks control 80% of UK lending. We were told we were creating competitive markets, whereas in fact we created a global network of interlinked oligopolies. o Globalization. Globalization may be interpreted as the effort of business to escape national regulation. It was based on the export of manufacturing jobs where unions were strong, and rebuilding the economy on the basis of the service industry where they were weak. Globalization was the business response to the declining rate of profit which Marx predicted. It was seen as the master key to overall improvement in the position of the business class. It increased corporate profits, reduced prices of consumer goods, and made possible a huge influx of outside money into the western banking system. But, most important, it was used as a bludgeon to frighten workers and to emasculate their economic and political power. One consequence of the new paradigm is that the welfare state as the basis of the social contract was replaced by access to credit. “Maintaining growth of spending on consumption requires continued excessive borrowing and continued reduction in savings rates. Continued excessive borrowing requires ever increasing asset prices and debt/income ratios; hence the systematic need for bubbles (which eventually burst). Meanwhile, when the 4/17/2017 Robert Skidelsky ­ The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes Versus Marx http://www.skidelskyr.com/print/the­crisis­of­capitalism­keynes­versus­marx 8/9 savings rate hits zero, little further reduction is possible. Consequently, both drivers of demand eventually exhaust themselves”. And “the policy triumph of corporate globalization accelerated the process and transformed it into a financial crash” (Palley 2009:14, 16). In my book, Keynes­The Return of the Master, I took seriously Keynes’s well­known remark about practical men being the slaves of some defunct economist. Chicago doctrines in the name of which markets were largely de­regulated were an updated, supermathematicised version of the ideas Keynes had challenged seventy years earlier. Politicians, regulators, bankers, asset managers, financial journalists became slaves not to defunct economists but to a cluster of Nobel prize winning economists who held chairs in the vicinity of Chicago University. Today I would attach more importance than I did when writing the book to the fact that the separation between the academic producers of ideas and the world of money­making has narrowed enormously since Keynes’s day, and mainly because of the dominance of finance in today’s economies and the dependence of financial intermediation on mathematical forecasting models. Financial academics, particularly in the United States, are now in a position to profit directly from their theories. Many are involved in the financial sector, as hedge fund managers, consultants, analysts, or strategists. It should not strain credulity to assert that they promote ideas which favour their financial interests. Prospects of Keynesianism What then are the prospects of a revival of Keynesianism? To be sure Keynes enjoyed a remarkable second coming in the immediate aftermath of the financial crash. In confirmation of Robert Lucas’s admission “I guess everyone is a Keynesian in the foxhole”, governments the world over instituted stimulus policies to stop the slide into depression. This is in marked contrast to what happened in the 1930s, and testifies to the enduring power of Keynes’s commonsense. So far, so Keynes. The question is whether we can afford to go along with a system which crashes every few years, with increasingly serious social consequences. It is probably impossible, as well as undesirable, to restore the trade unions as a ‘countervailing power’ in the Anglo­American type of economies dominated by the service sector and high tech manufacture. The liberal solution of breaking up concentrations of big business (‘trust busting’ as the Americans used to call it) is probably unavailable in the increasingly integrated global market. The key to any restoration of a Keynesian political economy is thus the rehabilitation of the state as an instrument of the public interest. It can be argued that national states cannot control global capital and that a world state is unavailable. But a ‘single world’ model of globalization is not the only one. It is far more plausible to think of global integration developing via regional integration. This offers a more feasible route to reinserting democratic oversight of the economy. However, this is a huge question which I cannot address today. Meanwhile, I wonder how many more crashes there will have to be before ideas about the future of society more sensible than those put forward by today’s ‘market sentiment’ win a sufficient hearing to influence the course of events.

 References References Collini, Stefan (2009),
“Impact on Humanities”, TLS 13 November Cartwright, Nancy, (1999),
The Dappled World, CUP, Cambridge Dasgupta, Amir Kumar (1985),
 Epochs of Economic Theory, BSIL Blackwell, Oxford Davidson, Paul (2007),
John Maynard Keynes, Palgrave Macmillan, London Galbraith, J.K. (1952), American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, Harper Publications, London Gough, Ian (1975),
“State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism”, New Left Review, 92 Keynes, J.M (1936),
The General Theory of Employment, Interest & Money, Macmillan, London, reproduced in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol vii,
Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, London, 1973
Keynes, J.M. (1945), Letter to S.G. Macfarlane, 5 June 1945

27.2.17

DIALOG cu sufletul deschis

Prof. Ioan Aurel Pop: Da, împrejurările de nesiguranță, de marasm, de impunere a dreptului forței din acest moment seamănă cu cele din 1938-1940! Eu cred încă în forța rațiunii acestui popor, care trebuie să se trezească

Mircea Platon Profesorul Ioan Aurel Pop este rectorul celei mai bine cotate instituții de învățământ superior din România, Universitatea Babeș-Bolyai, cel mai tânăr membru al Academiei Române, unul dintre marii istorici ai Țării, dar mai presus de toate, o voce lucidă și înțeleaptă prin care parcă auzim, dacă ascultăm cu atenție, cuvântul conștiinței noastre cele bune


Să ascultăm, deci.
Rep: Domnule profesor, mulțumim pentru amabilitatea de a ne oferi un interviu în aceste zile, mai ales în condițiile în care aveți o agendă foarte încărcată...Să intrăm direct în subiect:  Conform proiectului de programă școlară, „în ciclul gimnazial istoria își asumă formarea unor mecanisme intelectuale care să prevină orice forme de naționalism, de formare de stereotipii și xenofobie.” În egală măsură, se urmărește ca aceeași disciplină „să stimuleze asumarea multiculturalității și multiperspectivității”. Cum am putea prezenta incursiunile lui Mihai Viteazul în Sudul Dunării, dintr-o perspectivă multiculturală? Cum am putea prezenta în condiții de multiculturalism - fără să facem procese de intenție lui Ștefan cel Mare, de pildă - istoria Țărilor Române, în condițiile în care capitulațiile încheiate de domnitorii noștri urmăreau tocmai protejarea spațiului de influența culturii și religiei islamice?


Românii au devenit, din fire, ascultători, după atâția stăpâni care le-au dictat mereu, secole la rând, ce să facă și ce să zică. Trendul european și chiar mondial era, până nu demult, „discriminarea pozitivă”, integrarea euro-atlantică, globalizarea, internaționalizarea etc. Pe acest fond, noi, românii, am fost atât de des acuzați de naționalism, antisemitism, xenofobie, încât unii puteau avea impresia că fuseserăm în stare, cândva, să aducem Europa la pierzanie, prin nimicnicia noastră. Așa că am ajuns să ne punem cenușă în cap și când nu trebuia, cu speranța că doar-doar vom fi iertați pentru toate, pentru cele făcute și pentru cele nefăcute.

Programa aceasta este o mostră de „suflat și în iaurt”! Vă dați seama, ca și mine, că nu trebuie proclamate asemenea principii, ci trebuie respectate tacit. Cine și de ce ar putea pune în manuale, în România actuală, „forme de naționalism” și de „xenofobie”? Mai ales că, vrând să fim politicește corecți, noi am uitat complet să ne prezentăm lumii ca români. Suntem europeni și basta! Majoritatea analiștilor, formatorilor de opinie, invitaților de serviciu pe platouri, eseiștilor etc. nu fac distincție între națiune și național, patriotism, naționalism, xenofobie, șovinism. Or, definițiile sunt simple, ca la școală: patriotul este cel care-și iubește locul de naștere, al lui, al părinților și bunicilor etc. (dacă ele concordă) și nu cel care urăște patriile altora; națiunea este o formă de comunitate umană veche de multe secole, este un fel al oamenilor de a trăi împreună, uniți prin limbă, origine, istorie, religie, teritoriu, cultură, tradiții etc. (sau măcar prin unele din acestea); toți oamenii din lume trăiesc uniți în comunități, fiindcă omul e o ființă socială; spirit național înseamnă cultivarea identității etnice proprii, în rând și împreună cu identitățile altora; naționalism înseamnă glorificarea propriei națiuni, prin ignorarea sau, uneori, în detrimentul altora; xenofobia este ura față de străini, față de cei care nu sunt ca tine ori ca grupul tău; șovinismul marchează ideologia vrăjmășiei dintre popoare și națiuni și a superiorității unei/ unor națiuni față de alta/ altele etc. Toate aceste noțiuni au semnificații destul de clare, dar unora le place să le amalgameze, suprapună, demonizeze în bloc, ca să obțină o confuzie generală. Pe al cărei fond, să se poată apoi broda …

Ideologiile prezenteiste – nu doar la noi – tind să înfățișeze istoria, adică viața oamenilor care au trăit odinioară, în funcție de valorile actuale. Vă dau un exemplu: în urmă cu vreo două decenii, s-a obținut cu greu aprobarea ca, la Viena, într-un loc istoric anume, să fie pusă o placă de marmură, care să amintească faptul că și românii, alături de alții, au ajutat la despresurarea orașului, asediat de otomani în 1683; textul, compus de specialiști, cuprindea sintagma, luată din înscrisuri de epocă, „apărarea Republicii Creștine europene”; ideologul de serviciu local ne-a spus (eram câțiva profesori din țări ale Europei Centrale și de Sud-Est) că nu era politic bine, fiindcă s-ar fi putut supăra turcii din Viena, din Occident și chiar din Turcia; atunci, am propus „apărarea civilizației europene” și am aflat că era tot restrictiv și ofensator! Până la urmă, eu m-am lăsat păgubaș, fiindcă mi se cerea să schimb istoria, adică să adaptez idealurile și ideile oamenilor de la 1683 celor din 1995, să nu mai reiasă că, atunci, turcii (islamici) și creștinii se băteau între ei! Nu la mult timp după, s-a ajuns iarăși la lupte violente între islamici și creștini (europeni), ca o ironie a sorții! Evident că nu pot să-l prezint le Mihai Viteazul decât în acord cu morala epocii lui: a trecut la sud de Dunăre în numele creștinilor ca să-i combată pe musulmani, eventual chiar să elibereze Constantinopolul, unde era așteptat de greci ca un eliberator, ca un erou. Tot evident este că domnii români, de la Mircea cel Bătrân și Ștefan cel Mare încoace, au luptat contra otomanilor care-i atacau și îi presau, i-au învins sau au fost învinși și au încheiat tratate (inegale, ca-n Evul Mediu), cu drepturi și obligații, conform cărora, printre altele, turcii nu puteau face prozelitism islamic la noi, nu puteau construi moschei și alte locuri de cult mahomedane etc.

Nu poți să inventezi multiculturalism acolo unde este confruntare între etnii, culturi și civilizații! Firește, depinde cum prezinți aceste situații, dar ignorarea sau „ajustarea” lor înseamnă fals și minciună.

Iar astăzi este defazat să faci asta! Azi, când Marea Britanie întoarce spatele Europei ca să-i fie ei mai bine, când America vrea să fie numai a americanilor (care?) și face ziduri la graniță, când Ungaria, Polonia sau Cehia își proslăvesc propriile națiuni și exprimă, nu de puține ori, rezerve sau chiar ură față de altele, față de vecini!

Spuneați, într-o cuvântare ținută la Bistrița anul trecut și care a devenit foarte populară pe internet, că Mihai Viteazul a fost criticat de otomani,  - firesc, pentru că atâția au pierit de sabia lui, dar și de occidentali, pentru că și-a urmărit interesul propriu. S-ar putea spune că a fost, deci, naționalist? Sau trebuie să-l criticăm pe Mihai pentru că și-a „trădat” sistemul de alianțe, cum am spune azi?

Haideți să numărăm câte alianțe au trădat Germania, Anglia sau Franța, de la Marea Revoluție Franceză încoace și apoi să vorbim! Acelea însă nu sunt „trădări” – fiindcă nu sună bine termenul – ci sunt „Realpolitik”, mărturii de „echilibru european”, „adaptări subtile la realități” etc. Este evident că „politica interesului național”, valabilă de la Renaștere încoace (când Francisc I, catolicul rege al Franței, prin 1530, s-a aliat cu Suleiman Magnificul, sultanul otoman, contra unor suverani creștini!) și dusă de marile puteri, nu le era permisă micilor principi. Egalitatea nu este și pentru căței, vorba fabulistului! Sau non licet bovis quod licet Iovis, adică „nu-i este permis boului ceea ce îi este permis lui Jupiter”! În plus, Mihai era și „schismatic”(termenul occidental peiorativ pentru ortodocși), iar asta, în condițiile prejudecăților puternice de-atunci, nu prea dădea bine în Occident. Nu, Mihai nu a fost naționalist (vă spuneam că naționalist înseamnă proslăvirea exclusivă a propriei națiuni, prin ignorarea ori în detrimentul altora) și nici nu a urmărit formarea României la 1600. Nu erau încă, la noi, vremurile coapte pentru așa ceva. Mihai a făurit un bloc politic puternic antiotoman, dar l-a făcut din cele trei țări care aveau, nu peste prea mult timp, să formeze România. A și luat importante măsuri în favoarea românilor asupriți din Transilvania, a creat stema unită a celor trei țări, a pregătit o dinastie uniunii (federației) nou create etc. Aș zice că Mihai Viteazul a fost mai întâi creștin și apoi român (nu contează aici „sângele” sau originea; a fost principe român, s-a purtat ca român și a fost perceput ca român de către contemporani). Prin faptele sale, Mihai a fost transformat, mai ales de la romantism încoace, în erou național. Aceasta nu este nici de bine și nici de rău, ci este o constatare. Toate țările au eroi naționali sau părinți ai patriei! Dacă și-a urmărit și interesul personal (cine nu face asta în viață?!), a făcut-o în așa fel încât acest interes s-a potrivit cu interesul țării și, lucru rar, cu interesul de perspectivă sau de viitor al românilor.
De aceea, Mihai Viteazul este o mare personalitate a istoriei românilor. Acuzele de „condotier” etc. vin, de regulă, din vârful buzelor, de la neistorici ori de la istorici teribiliști, adolescenți întârziați, care urmăresc spectacularul, succesul facil, profitul de imagine și nu numai.

Trecând în alt plan, vreau să vă întreb despre apelul semnat, inițial alături de alte 83 de personalități ale Academiei Române, un apel la unitate, la cinstirea eroilor și înaintașilor care au făcut posibilă Marea Unire pe care o sărbătorim sau „comemorăm”? anul viitor. Un post de televiziune cu patron din Ardeal a scris că acest îndemn este unul cu „accent puternic naționalist”. Având în vedere conotațiile negative care i se asociază acestui termen, de naționalist, nu se va ajunge la momentul în care și corifeii unirii vor fi portretizați, la nivel oficial, ca niște personaje negative?

Distinse Domnule Șomănescu, acum sunt, din câte știu, în ciuda a vreo trei răzgândiți, peste 100 de membri ai Academiei care au semnat (dintre cei circa 200 membri români). Oamenii (și academicienii sunt oameni, cu defecte și calități) au făcut-o cu sinceritate, crezând – în naivitatea lor – că Academia se bucură de respect, fiind ea încă forul suprem de recunoaștere a creației științifice și culturale, de consacrare formală a valorilor afirmate, un fel de empireu al spiritelor luminate ale națiunii, în sensul scopului pentru care ea a fost creată la 1866. Se poate ca unii academicieni – înaintați, firește, în vârstă – să fi uitat de democrația noastră originală și să fi sperat că vorbele lor vor fi luate în serios, chiar dacă și criticate. Nu spun că unii – importante voci ale acestui popor – nu au luat în serios apelul, dar văd alții l-au caricaturizat, respins, condamnat, aș zice aproape cu „mânie proletară”. Observ că și unii reprezentanți ai partidelor extremiste maghiare s-au inflamat, deși este vorba despre un apel la pace, la respectarea Constituției României etc. Iar Constituția nu permite autonomii teritoriale după niciun criteriu. Nicio propoziție, frază sau noțiune din apel nu jignește vreo altă națiune sau vreo minoritate. În schimb, dacă aș lua câteva exemple de discurs politic din pozițiile oficiale ale partidului de guvernământ din Ungaria și ale înaltelor oficialități de acolo, am putea vedea că lucrurile stau cu totul altfel. Nu vreau sa spun mai mult!

Dar nu aceasta este problema! Doar ne-am cucerit cu sânge dreptul la libertate și democrație, la pluralitatea părerilor! Chestiunea este de formă și anume se referă la felul în care combatem o opinie cu care nu suntem de acord. Apelative de genul „bătrâni ramoliți”, „adunătură de expirați buni de dus la cimitir”, „comuniști”, „ceaușiști” etc. – adresate unor oameni, totuși, reprezentanți ai unei instituții a acestui stat – sunt descalificante, dovedesc nu numai intoleranță, ci și paupertate intelectuală, spirit grobian, lipsă de educație și multe altele. Nu se pot respinge de plano noțiuni consacrate și uzitate peste tot în lume, precum „națiune”, „unire”, „suveranitate” etc., fără argumentări precise, din simplul motiv că nu plac unora dintre noi sau că avem alte comandamente de servit.
Se vor fi „tocit” unele cuvinte, dar ele există și cu atât mai mult realitățile pe care le exprimă. Cea mai cuprinzătoare reuniune internațională de state se cheamă încă „Organizația Națiunilor Unite”; Marea Britanie ne anunță că, după Brexit, revine la anumite atribute ale „suveranității”, la care renunțase prin tratatele UE; autoritățile de la Madrid dau comunicate prin care reiterează conservarea „unității” Spaniei etc. Anumite mijloace de difuzare în masă nu cunosc semnificația termenului de „naționalism” și intervin public ca să se afle în treabă.

Am ajuns să ne întrebăm dacă e bine sau rău să cinstim cei 100 de ani trecuți de la Marea Unire, ceea ce este foarte grav! Înseamnă că ne merităm soarta mizeră, dezorientată, modestă. De regulă, comemorarea se face într-o atmosferă de tristețe, când ne gândim la anii trecuți de la moartea cuiva sau de la un eveniment tragic.
Marii înfăptuitori ai Marii Uniri s-au bucurat, au exultat, unii (ca Gheorghe Pop de Băsești) nu au putut muri decât după pronunțarea actului de la 1 Decembrie 1918. Cum să comemorăm? Noi trebuie să ne bucurăm și să retrăim „Poemele luminii”, cum ar spune Lucian Blaga, să ne umplem de încredere pentru că, alături de italieni, de germani, de polonezi, de cehi și slovaci, de slavii de sud, am intrat în rândul lumii. Să ne bucurăm și pentru că, pe ruinele unor imperii perimate, am construit edificii naționale solide. Cele mai legitime mișcări colective din secolul al XIX-lea – „secolul națiunilor” – au fost cele de emancipare națională, în acord cu principiul autodeterminării naționale, recunoscut inclusiv de SUA sub președintele Woodrow Wilson.
Firește, ca în cazul oricărui act omenesc, nu au putut să fie toți mulțumiți nici în 1918. Austriecii, otomanii, germanii, rușii și, mai ales, ungurii, au fost frustrați, supărați, dornici de revanșă. Sunt de acord că ungurii (mai ales cei din Ungaria) nu au ce sărbători la 1 Decembrie 2018 și că ei trebuie să comemoreze, dar, în logica aceasta, nici românii nu au ce să sărbătorească la 15 martie 2018, pentru atunci vor fi 170 de ani de la decizia dietei ungare de unire a Transilvaniei cu Ungaria! Aici, cu sărbătorile, suntem chit, numai că decizia românească din 1918 este încă în practică.  Asta este sigura deosebire, în rest, prin zilele naționale, ne „gratulăm” reciproc. Așa este între vecini! Vedeți cum este și la alte popoare, cu pretenții, nu ca noi!
Dacă aplicăm această logică strâmbă, atunci mă aștept ca unii să-i condamne pe corifeii Marii Uniri, fiindcă nu ar fi respectat drepturile omului, deși acestea nu erau încă formulate, sau că nu i-au consultat pe toți cetățenii prin referendum, deși atunci nimeni nu ar fi putut s-o facă!
Noi suntem capabili de orice! Ar fi, totuși, o mare rușine, care ne-ar arăta adevărata față de epigoni. Altminteri, eu aș fi cel dintâi fericit să văd la 2018 o Europă unită și fericită, generoasă și curată, patria primitoare a tuturor cetățenilor săi, dar mă tem să nu văd doar intoleranță, șovinism, ură națională și rasială etc. și nu neapărat pe la noi, ci în țările unde s-a născut democrația modernă, libertatea, egalitatea și frăția …

Domnule profesor, eu am senzația că trăiesc într-o perioadă asemănătoare cu anii de dinainte de 1940. Pare-mi-se că sunt după alegerile din 1938, când Regele Carol al II-lea s-a supărat pe rezultatul electoral, când vechile înțelegeri de securitate se prăbușeau, când se crea o nouă ordine mondială. Și atunci, ca și acum, autoritățile și poporul par să fie mai degrabă preocupați de războiul cel dintre noi. Convingeți-mă că greșesc și că un nou 1940 nu este deloc aproape....

Mi-ar plăcea, firește, să vă conving, să am argumente să vă conving și, mai ales, să fiu eu însumi convins! Dar nu sunt! Asta este ca-n replica profesorului care le reproșează elevilor că nu înțeleg lecția: „Copii, v-am explicat o dată și nu ați înțeles nimic, v-am explicat a doua oară și voi tot nu ați înțeles; a treia oară am înțeles și eu, iar voi tot nu ați înțeles!”. Cu alte cuvinte, ca să vă conving, trebuie să fiu eu convins … Pe de altă parte, istoria nu se repetă întocmai niciodată, din pricină că – ar fi zis A. D. Xenopol – faptele istorice sunt fapte de succesiune și nu de repetiție. Se petrec o dată și petrecute rămân! Nu pot să le reproduc în laborator, așa cum descompun apa în hidrogen și oxigen, de câte ori doresc!

Da, împrejurările de nesiguranță, de marasm, de impunere a dreptului forței din acest moment seamănă cu cele din 1938-1940! Dictatori mari sau mici vor să ne convingă, acum ca și atunci,cât sunt ei de democrați. Hitler opera cu masele, cu mulțimile care umpleau piețele și reitera ideea că luarea prin forță a unui teritoriu de către Germania era legitimă și că era ultima sa pretenție. Și azi se iau teritorii de la alții, în virtutea drepturilor istorice sau altminteri. Democrația directă a străzii – aparent forța poporului – se impune și azi în fața democrației reprezentative. Trei guverne recente ale României au fost schimbate de popor, cum se spune. Pe bună dreptate, unii se întreabă de ce să mai meargă la vot! Ni se spune că românii sunt idioți și că nu știu ce votează! Chiar dacă ar fi așa (idiot înseamnă, literal, analfabet), votul este vot, cu avantajele și dezavantajele sale. Dezinformarea este în floare, iar manipulările de tot felul ne lasă deconcertați, uluiți, prostiți! În cine și în ce să mai credem? De data aceasta, chestiunea mi se pare gravă, cum spuneți, fiindcă nu numai românii par lipsiți de busolă (ei sunt obișnuiți să fie așa!), ci lumea întreagă.

Și totuși, eu cred că mai sunt mecanisme de reglare și de autoreglare pe care nu le știm și pe care nu le-am folosit încă. În ciuda tuturor relelor – și au fost multe! – de mii de ani ființa umană și comunitățile (inclusiv națiunile, fie etnice, fie civice) au găsit resurse de viețuire, de supraviețuire și de conviețuire, atunci când se spera mai puțin. Pe scurt, nu vă pot convinge, pentru că nu am certitudini, dar speranțe am … Altminteri, nu aș fi om!   

Sărind de la una, la alta...Spuneați, în cadrul Adunării Naționale Bisericești de anul acesta, că aveți un coleg la Cluj supărat pe o televiziune bucureșteană care nu arată temperatura din orașul dvs.... Cum poate fi explicată o astfel de supărare dintre Ardeal spre Vechiul Regat, având în vedere că președintele țării, președintele CCR, șeful SRI, șeful DNA, Avocatul Poporului,  Ministrul Apărării Naționale, Procurorul General al României, Patriarhul României si Prim-ministrul sunt din Vestul Țării? De ce nu întâlnim această atitudine în Moldova, care nu are niciun reprezentant în aceste poziții înalte?

Da, am dat un exemplu frust și, poate, naiv de dur, ca să arăt că, deși sunt deosebiri reale între provinciile istorice românești, acestea nu trebuie exacerbate, nu trebuie augmentate. Mai întâi, pentru că nu există țară pe lumea asta (poate în afară de Vatican, Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein) fără provincii, fără deosebiri regionale, fără rivalități locale. În al doilea rând, prin comparație, noi, ardelenii, muntenii, moldovenii etc. suntem mult mai asemănători între noi decât sunt lombarzii, sicilienii, venețienii, ligurii, toscanii, sarzii, umbrii, friulanii etc. sau decât sunt bavarezii și prusienii între ei. Totuși, țara unită s-a format și la noi târziu (nu ca la francezi, obosiți și ei acum de atâta unitate!). În al treilea rând, trebuie să-i dăm istoriei șansa să funcționeze și să ne arate cum este bine: or la noi, după circa un mileniu de singurătate (ca să-l parafrazez pe Gabriel Garcia Marquez), am avut nici măcar un veac întreg de unitate! Oare sunt comparabile cele două segmente temporale, încât să ne pronunțăm atât de critic față de scurta noastră experiență împreună?
Bunicii și străbunicii noștri au făcut unirea sătui de relele dezbinării și convinși de avantajele unirii, sătui de umilințe și jigniri, de atâtea rătăciri pe coordonate străine, dornici de un adăpost pentru acest neam! Ce cuvânt am avea noi să spunem că ei au greșit?
Este evident că trăim vremuri dificile, pe care unii ni le facem singuri și mai dificile. Pe fondul dezorientării generale, sunt destui care pescuiesc în ape tulburi și exagerează provincialismele, entitățile locale. Să știți că și unii moldoveni sunt îndemnați să se supere pe bucureșteni! Unde mai pui că Dodon, susținut de Putin, vrea Moldova mare! Iar în Moldova noastră, mai circulă din când în când câte o marotă: Bucovina nu este Moldova, ci altceva, superior, fiindcă Bucovina a fost sub austrieci și s-a ridicat în ritm cu Europa! Nimic mai fals: Bucovina este Țara de Sus a Moldovei, cu vechile capitale Baia, Siret și Suceava, cu gropnițele domnești cu Putna lui Ștefan; din Bucovina (numită astfel târziu) a pornit toată Țara Moldovei. Cum să nu fie Bucovina Moldova, din moment ce este nucleul, sufletul Țării Moldovei? Cu Transilvania e mai complicat! A stat cel mai mult înstrăinată (aproape un mileniu) și nu s-a putut bucura de viață oficială românească decât după 1918. Transilvania (în sens larg, cu Banatul, Crișana, Maramureșul) reprezintă azi, în linii mari, 40% din suprafața și populația țării. Las deoparte materiile prime din subsol și de pe sol, orașele mari, zestrea istorică variată și bogată etc.
În Transilvania, vechile „națiuni” dominante și mai ales ungurii au crescut, generații la rând, cu mentalitate de stăpâni, iar românii cu mentalitate de supuși, de slugi, de servitori. După 1918, lucrurile s-au schimbat, dar mentalitățile mai greu. De asta, a fost și grea conviețuirea între români și maghiari. După un secol, în fine – în ciuda frângerii dureroase din anii 1940-1944 – se simt si românii ardeleni mai puternici. Unde mai pui că ei sunt (măcar sub aspect geografic) cei mai occidentali dintre români și că civilizația de succes în lume a fost cea occidentală, în vreme ce lumea bizantino-slavă, care ne-a trasat destinul medieval, a intrat în iremediabil regres și s-a degradat în fanariotism, balcanism etc. Din secolul al XVIII-lea încoace, românii, prin elitele lor cele mai active și conștiente, se străduiesc să se sincronizeze cu Occidentul, or cei care au fost cel mai aproape de acest model au fost transilvănenii. Pe fondul acestor deosebiri reale și mentale, le este ușor unora să semene vânt.
Ceea ce vă pot eu spune sigur, ca istoric, este următoarea constatare: după căderea Imperiului Roman, Europa a trăit două experiențe opuse, una de fărâmițare în mici unități numite domenii, seniorii, ducate, marchizate, comitate, principate etc. și alta de integrare în mari entități precum imperiul (carolingian, romano-german) și universalismul papal. Nu au reușit niciunele! Primele erau prea mici, iar celelalte prea mari. Și a fost cumva găsită calea de mijloc, a statelor naționale (centralizate, federale etc.), imperfectă și ea. În acest moment istoric (de câteva decenii) s-a încercat noua formulă integratoare numită UE, care este în impas. Ce va fi, vom vedea, dar subiecții de drept în UE sunt, deocamdată, statele, multe dintre ele state-națiuni. Atenție însă la antagonizarea românilor pe criterii provinciale! Se lucrează intens la ea, inclusiv în contextul discuției despre regionalizare și nu toți „formatorii de opinie” urmăresc scopuri oneste față de această țară.

Să ne întoarcem puțin la identitate...Spuneați tot anul trecut, la Bistrița că, Mihai Viteazul ar fi zis: „Românii s-au născut pravoslavnici și bizantini și așa trebuie să rămână”. În școală se vorbește foarte puțin și mai degrabă peiorativ despre spațiul bizantin, iar despre apartenența noastră la acest areal, mai deloc. De ce există această blocadă la adresa bizantinismului? Cum se defineau marii noștri domnitori? Bizantini, Apuseni sau niciuna nici alta?

Am răspuns, parțial, mai sus la această întrebare. Mihai Viteazul a avut convingerea dreptei credințe care venea pentru el de la Noua Romă (Constantinopol), oraș pe care-l voia eliberat de sub „păgâni”. Aceasta era mentalitatea vremii și nu putem să-i cerem lui domnului român să fi gândit politic corect, precum președintele ONU de astăzi.
În școală – grăbită și ea, ca planeta – nu mai este timp să li se explice elevilor că noi, românii, ne-am format în regiunea de interferență dintre Occidentul latin (catolic) și Orientul bizantin sau bizantino-slav (ortodox), că suntem occidentali prin limbă, originea romană, nume și forma de creștinare, pe de o parte și răsăriteni prin biserică și credință (de rit bizantin), prin limba cultului, a culturii și a cancelariilor (slavona), prin alfabetul chirilic (păstrat până în secolul al XIX-lea), prin mentalitatea de fiecare zi. Numai că bizantinismul, peste care s-a suprapus cuceritorul otoman vreme de 6-7 secole (1354-1913 și mai mult) a fost un model de civilizație perdant în fața impetuosului model vestic, descătușat mai ales după marile descoperiri geografice, după Renaștere și Reformă. Europa s-a expandat în lume, dar nu toată, ci doar prin acest model concurențial și individualist, liberal și democratic, bazat pe competiție. Modelul nostru răsăritean, contemplativ și isihast, letargic și nemișcat, fatalist și tragic, deși atins parcă de aripa veșniciei – mai ales în creația artistică, de excepție – dar a rămas cantonat în plan secund. Domnii noștri cei mari erau și una și alta, mândrii de această dimensiune complexă a lor: Mircea cel Bătrân purta și veșminte occidentale și participa la turniruri, precum cavalerii francezi; Ștefan cel Mare se adresa fără complexe papei, împăratului roman-german sau senatului Veneției și era recunoscut în Vest drept „preaputernic atlet al lui Hristos”; Mihai Viteazul se mișca în voie la Viena și la Praga, după alianțe creștine occidentale, participa și el la întreceri militare și la petreceri cu ștaif, dansând pe ritmuri italiene.     

V-am tot întrebat de identitate și iată de ce. Cum vă explicați că, deși avem toate informațiile la îndemână, repetăm aceleași greșeli din trecut, inclusiv înlocuirea „furculition”-ului cu „party”-ul de azi? În proiectul de programă școlară de care vorbirăm (că tot sunt din Kleine Walachei)  la începutul interviului, experții de la Institutul pentru Educație au scris cuvântul „multiperspectivitate”, care nu există în limba română...Nu cumva problema noastră este una de identitate?

De ce vorbesc eu mereu de nevoia noastră de identitate, încât am obosit? Am obosit nu fiindcă sunt făcut (etichetat) naționalist – m-am obișnuit și cu asta!– ci fiindcă parcă vorbesc în gol. Vă rog să ieșiți pe stradă și să întrebați câțiva români de ce se simt români. Veți vedea și veți auzi cele mai mari gugumănii! Iar dacă te duci la Bruxelles, la Madrid ori la Vilnius, între oameni serioși, întrebarea care vine invariabil este: cum este România și cine sunt românii? Firește, ne autoflagelăm și ne prezentăm ca neam de nimic!
Mai nou, unii au găsit soluția: se dau altceva și nu se mai recunosc români. Poate că această lejeritate în a trata lucrurile serioase să ne fi și salvat din când în când, în trecut, dar ea nu poate fi mereu o conduită de viață pentru un popor decent, conștient. Dar, vreau să mă refer la limba noastră și să vă spun convingerea mea în legătură cu ea: limba noastră ne-a salvat ca să nu fim pulverizați de istorie! Repet și pentru cititorii Dumneavoastră: pe la 1480-1490, un umanist italian care i-a cunoscut direct pe români (Anton Bonfini), se miră cum s-au păstrat „coloniile romane” aici, în Dacia, aproape nealterate, fără să fie copleșite de „valurile de barbari” și răspunde, surprinzător, că românii „și-au apărat mai mult limba decât viața”.
Această constare îi salvează pe români de toate relele și-i ridică între cei aleși de soartă să fie privilegiați. Perfectul simplu indicativ din Oltenia și de pe Jiurile ardelene, din Țara Hațegului (parte, cândva, a Voievodatului lui Litovoi), mergând până pe unele văi din Munții Apuseni, acest perfect simplu este cea mai bună dovadă de latinitate și de continuitate, pentru că vine ca directă moștenire latină. Oltenia a stat sub romani, mai ales jumătatea de sud, cu vreo două secole mai mult ca Transilvania, de aceea structura graiului local este mai aproape de latina populară. Limba noastră este una permisivă și se deschide cu generozitate neologismelor, dar până la un punct. Dacă forțăm nota, cădem în ridicol și cam așa facem acum nu doar sub influența englezei, ci și a digitalizării în haină engleză. De aceea, Academia Română ar avea și aici un rol ponderator, dar cine s-o mai ia în seamă! Românii sunt acum nu numai inventivi, ci și independenți și liberi. Să facă orice!    

Apropo de etichetări, să vorbim puțin și de perioada comunistă. Cine încearcă să privească nuanțat această perioadă se poate trezi cu invective de tipul „ceaușist”, „legionar” sau „nostalgic”. De ce nu putem discuta deschis despre martirii din închisori sau de rezistența din munți, sine ira et studio?

Mi-e greu să vă spun, fiindcă problema este foarte complicată. Vedeți, regimul comunist, de paste patru decenii are trei etape mari: una proletcultistă, de internaționalism proletar și de dictatură stalinistă atroce, când nimic din ceea ce era românesc nu era bun, ci „putred”, „burghez”, „decadent”; o alta mai echilibrată, în care s-a revenit la majoritatea valorilor noastre autentice (minus monarhia modernă, Basarabia, diaspora etc.); ultima, naționalist-comunistă, în care ne conducea „geniul Carpaților” și în care trecutul, prezentul și viitorul erau aureolate de glorie, în vreme ce muream de foame, de frig, de întuneric. Toate acestea se amalgamează astăzi intenționat, încât nu mai este loc pentru nuanțe. Când nu-l ai la suflet pe cineva, mai ales dacă acel cineva are și o anumită vârstă, îl numești „comunist”, „boșorog” și îl acuzi de-a dreptul că a trăit sub regimul odios. Mă și mir, câteodată, cum de mi-am ales să trăiesc trei decenii din viață în acel regim condamnat de istorie, când puteam și eu să fiu măcar un gânditor medieval, precum călugărul Dan din „Sărmanul Dionis” de Mihai Eminescu! Am impresia că unii chiar cred că noi (generația mea) ne-am ales comunismul și ne condamnă „cu mânie proletară” pentru proasta alegere. Nu mai revin la convingerea unora că toți cei care au trăit în comunism sunt de-a dreptul troglodiți!

Văd că se discută, totuși, în unele cercuri, despre închisori și rezistența din munți, dar îndrăzneții sunt repede aduși cu picioarele pe pământ de către noii cenzori, de către noii ideologi, vigilenți să nu deviem de la calea justă.
Am scăpat de adevărul unic de sub comunism și am dat de adevărurile controlate de astăzi! Eu cred încă în forța rațiunii acestui popor, care trebuie să se trezească …

Ca istoric, știți bine rolul agenților de influență în viața politică și socială a unei țări. Din acest punct de vedere, cum vi se pare faptul că, în afară de două - trei excepții, între care și ActiveNews, majoritatea instituțiilor mass-media din România sunt patronate sau conduse de străini?

Stimate Domnule Șomănescu, este încă o dovadă că, deși „boierii minții”, spiritele subțiri, de viță veche, filosofii subtili de salon ne acuză de xenofobie, de naționalism și chiar de șovinism, noi ne încăpățânăm să-i iubim pe străini, chiar și pe aceia care ne fac rău! Firește că acești veghetori la mersul nației – văzută de ei ca o jalnică masă gregară, patibulară – nu descoperă nicio primejdie nicăieri, nici peste Prut și Nistru, de unde suntem amenințați direct, fără ocolișuri, nici spre vest, de unde ne vin tăietorii de păduri și noii stăpâni de moșii, nici peste Ocean, de unde ne vine vestea că NATO nu mai face pomeni și că SUA se închid în sine, nici de mai aproape, unde se pregătesc festinuri autonomiste etc. Cu alte cuvinte, România nu are inamici decât în închipuirea noastră! Este clar că această situație de care vorbiți înlesnește munca agenților de influență din viața politică și publică a României, deși sunt și destui români neaoși zeloși în sensul despre care vorbiți. Oricum ar fi, românii nu-i urăsc și nu-i vor urî pe străinii de bine, ba, pudici fiind, îi vor iubi și pe cei care le fac rău, după pilda biblică …  
În încheiere, domnule profesor, vă rog să ne relatați un episod istoric mai puțin cunoscut, din care să vedem ce atitudine aveau românii față de semenii lor...fie că e vorba de domnitori, de soldați, de oameni simpli...Mărturisesc că sunt puțin invidios pe studenții care au ocazia să vă asculte săptămânal...

Vreau să vă spun o întâmplare de demult despre identitatea de român, fiindcă de ea vorbirăm mult mai sus, spre disperarea unora, ba chiar stăturăm la taclale. Ea se leagă de personalitatea lui Matia Corvin (e corect Matia, fiindcă se născuse în ziua apostolului Matia și nu a evanghelistului Matei), regele Ungariei, care era, prin tatăl său, de spiță românească.
Ajuns suveran celebru, Matia se mai lovea încă de invocarea ironică sau caustică a originilor sale modeste „valahe”, a faptului că era de-un neam cu supușii „schismatici”, ceea ce l-a făcut să ia anumite măsuri. Când a ajuns rege, dar și mai târziu, când se visa împărat romano-german, suveranul era numit pe la colțuri Valachorum regulus(„regișorul românilor”), ca și Ștefan cel Mare. Voit ofensator pentru Matia – acuzat de elita „de sânge” maghiară că ar fi fost doar „un crăișor al românilor” –, titlul este măgulitor pentru Ștefan cel Mare, care își câștiga astfel admirația unor cronicari pentru protejarea Ungariei, prin oprirea tătarilor și otomanilor de a ataca Transilvania prin Moldova. D’origine humile de progenie de Valacchia („de origine umilă, de neam din Valahia”) era formula prin care birocrația venețiană îl înregistra pe Matia la urcarea pe tron, conform zvonurilor culese de la fața locului. Iar împăratul romano-german Frederic al III-lea observa disprețuitor că Matia era natus a Valachopatre („născut din tată român”).
E drept că originea românească a regelui este pusă uneori – în surse externe – în context pozitiv (cum face, pe la 1475-1476, solul venețian Sebastiano Baduario, care-i laudă pe români, caracterizați cu admirație ca fiind din neamul „serenisimului rege” Matia, pentru că au luptat mereu cu curaj contra turcilor, deopotrivă „alături de părintele său și de majestatea sa”). Dar asta nu a schimbat prea mult percepția negativă din interiorul regatului. Și acum vine episodul. Se pare că nici regele nu făcea întotdeauna un secret din această origine stânjenitoare: potrivit mărturiei polonezului Varsevicius (Krzystoff Warszewiecki), de la finele secolului al XVI-lea, cu date luate de la autori din epoca lui Matia, suveranul de la Buda declara unor soli moldoveni (numiți de polonez, conform obiceiului, „valahi”) ai lui Ștefan cel Mare, după ce aceștia își începuseră mesajul prin cuvinte românești („Spune domnului nostru”), că, dacă așa le era graiul, nu mai avea nevoie de interpret.
Nicolae Iorga credea că respingerea traducătorului de către Matia, la auzul celor trei cuvinte românești, putea să fie „un mijloc de a arăta că și acea limbă a strămoșilor săi, așa de asemenea cu latina, o înțelege”. Nu este foarte clar dacă regele înțelegea româna numai pentru că era foarte apropiată de latină sau și pentru că era limba strămoșilor și a unei părți a supușilor săi. Consemnarea este însă, dincolo de orice dubiu, o dovadă a asemănării românei cu latina. Declarând însă, de față cu demnitarii curții, că nu are nevoie de interpret, atunci când a auzit câteva cuvinte românești, marele om politic a alimentat și a confirmat cu siguranță rumorile despre descendența sa din români.
Elita ungară știa, în general, că suveranul avea origini „umile, valahe”și că zvonul despre descendența regelui din Sigismund de Luxemburg ținea mai mult de legendă, ca și ideea înrudirii cu dinastia princiară a Basarabilor din Țara Românească. Și oricum, chiar și „os domnesc” sau princiar fiind, înrudirea cu o dinastie românească „schismatică„, ai cărei membri erau vasali ai regilor Ungariei, nu aducea cu sine automat în interior tocmai înaltul prestigiu dorit de suveranul unei țări catolice precum Ungaria.
Matia Corvin a fost rege ungar și spirit renascentist european, într-o vreme când spunem că naționalitatea era de neglijat și, totuși, era privit de unii ca român, în acord cu neamul său pe linie paternă, cu neamul ultimului mare cruciat european, Iancu de Hunedoara. Și mai spun unii că identitatea etnică este o ficțiune!
Vă mulțumesc mult domnule profesor, a fost o onoare și o bucurie!
Vă mulțumesc și eu.